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FortiMail: a pre-auth RCE in the POP3 service (CVE-2026-44812) joins the CISA KEV

Published on 2026-10-026 min readCleanIssue

> TL;DR: A heap buffer overflow in the FortiMail POP3 service allows unauthenticated remote code execution (CVE-2026-44812, CVSS 8.8). CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities on October 2, 2026, deadline October 30. Fixed in FortiMail 7.6.6 and 8.0.4. A FortiMail instance is a mail gateway: the entry point that handles the mail of the whole organization.

Why a POP3 service matters

FortiMail is a mail gateway: inbound/outbound SMTP, and mailbox access via IMAP, POP3, and webmail. Most organizations close SMTP submission but leave the mailbox protocols open — POP3 on port 110, often without TLS.

That is exactly the protocol that is affected: the POP3 service handles the \USER\\/\\AUTH\\ exchange before authentication. The overflow happens in the parsing of the \AUTH\\ response — a crafted sequence (STLS, USER, then an abnormally long \AUTH\\ token) overflows a heap buffer and redirects execution.

The PoC (Fortinet PSIRT, vendor-confirmed): RCE as root, no credentials needed.

What root on the gateway gives the attacker

  • Read and modify mail for every mailbox hosted on the instance — PII, business exchanges, verification codes.
  • Send mail as the organization (BEC): the gateway's signature is already trusted by recipients' filters.
  • Pivot to the internal network: the gateway sits in the DMZ, but with credentials and routing it is one step from internal mail or AD.
  • A mail gateway is one of the richest entry points in an organization — and historically one of the least tested.

    Who is affected

  • FortiMail 7.4.x, 7.6.0 to 7.6.5, 8.0.0 to 8.0.3 — fixed in 7.6.6 and 8.0.4.
  • 7.4.x is EOL: if you are on 7.4, the patch will not be enough — the vendor recommends migrating to 7.6.6+ / 8.0.4+.
  • Palo Alto Unit 42: 9,412 FortiMail instances publicly exposed as of October 2, 2026.
  • What to check now

  • Apply 7.6.6 / 8.0.4 before October 30. If you cannot: close 110/995 (POP3) to the internet — users keep IMAP/webmail, the vulnerable protocol disappears.
  • Hunt for: POP3 \AUTH\\ exchanges from new source IPs in the last 7 days, unexpected files in \/var/tmp\\, new local accounts, processes not spawned by the mail service.
  • After an incident: rotate service and admin credentials, review outbound mail sent during the window (BEC), rebuild the appliance.
  • The lesson

    Mail is the only data flow where an external party can inject content (body, attachments) over protocol paths that have survived every migration. POP3, IMAP, EAS: the older the protocol, the more likely the parsing is a weak point. When a vendor says "affected service = POP3", the question to ask is: "is POP3 still listening, and for whom?"

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